The early part of the season has seen a move towards a more defined approach both in and out of possession. Some of the defensive changes have been driven by the goals we’ve conceded across my tenure here, particularly from crosses and balls played over the top. Our previous 5-4-1 defensive shape was too passive at times, allowing opponents to create wide overloads, find space in front of our full-backs and deliver into the penalty area. Centrally, we were also allowing opposition midfielders too much time and space to receive and progress the ball.

Out of possession, I’ve moved towards a 3-4-2-1 structure. The wide attacking players now operate as tracking wingers, supporting the wing-backs and helping prevent opponents from creating overloads in the wide channels. This can, and has, deviated based on the opponent: I’ve moved to a TAM when they had an IWB, a WOW when we were chasing a game and they had a particularly aggressive wing back and even an IOW when I wanted to really put pressure on a rare find at this level – a progressive centre back. Centrally, the two defensive midfielders have a more proactive responsibility, stepping towards opposition midfielders to disrupt their ability to receive, turn and play through us. This has only been possible this season now we’ve managed to upgrade the physicality and ball winning ability of the players at my disposal. These jumping midfielders should help protect the space in front of our back three, although we need to remain conscious of the space they leave behind, particularly against teams looking to play over our defensive line. So far, I’ve been impressed – they seem to jump interchangeably, and, because we’re not a naturally aggressive pressing side, they drop back in quite quickly when the threat moves.

In possession, the most noticeable development happens early in the transition into our attacking shape. As the team moves forward, the two 10s move infield to occupy the half-spaces, while the wing-backs continue to maintain width. This creates central receiving options without sacrificing our ability to stretch the opposition horizontally. Both of our goals come from turnovers with Sousa finding Ferreira between the lines, with the wing-back holding the outside position and Bernado Lourenco picking the ball up from a defensive turnover whilst still moving back to his more central in possession space. This early occupation of the half-spaces appears to be having a positive impact, giving us better connections through the middle and more opportunities to progress beyond the opposition’s midfield. It does mean that we now have two options – progress quickly to the free players in the half spaces, or build slower and more deliberately from the back, moving their press around to find attacking spaces.

Both changes reflect the same principle: we want to influence where the opposition can play and where we can progress. Width creates opportunities inside; midfield pressure helps deny those same opportunities to ouropponents.

30 | A TACTICAL TOOLBOX

One of the things I want to avoid with this Atlético side is making tactical changes simply for the sake of reacting to an opponent. The underlying principles should remain recognisable, regardless of the opposition’s shape or approach. We want to progress through pressure, occupy central spaces, encourage players to take responsibility in possession and create opportunities through movement and technical quality.

That doesn’t mean we have to approach every match in exactly the same way. There are occasions when a small adjustment can help us access the spaces we want to attack, without compromising the wider identity of the team. I’ve settled on two categories of tactical shouts: those that allow us to adjust our approach within the existing framework, and those reserved for particular game states.

Tier One: Tactical adjustments

These are not emergency measures or changes of philosophy. They are ways of approaching the same problem from a slightly different angle.

1. Play Out From the Back

When: Against opponents who press high, particularly those who commit two forwards to the first line of pressure and attempt to prevent our centre-backs from receiving comfortably.

Why: Our back three should give us a numerical advantage against a front two, but that advantage only matters if we use it properly. By asking the goalkeeper to distribute short, we can encourage the opposition to commit players towards the ball, potentially opening space beyond their first pressing line. The intention is to draw pressure, create passing angles and progress through the spaces that become available.

This is closely connected to one of our fundamental principles: we should be comfortable receiving and progressing under pressure. Playing out is not an aesthetic preference; it is a way of manipulating the opposition’s press and finding the next line.

2. Go Long

When: Against teams whose pressing structure makes it difficult to establish possession through our centre-backs, particularly when their forwards and midfielders commit aggressively towards our defensive line.

Why: This is not an instruction to abandon our football and start hitting hopeful balls towards the striker. It changes where we begin our possession. Instead of distributing to the centre-backs and building from the first line, the goalkeeper looks to find our wing-backs or attacking midfielders directly. We effectively begin the transition further up the pitch.

That distinction matters. Our wing-backs can receive in wider areas, while our attacking midfielders can offer options between the lines. If we can secure the initial ball, we have the opportunity to establish possession in areas where we would otherwise have to work through an aggressive press to reach. The centre-backs are bypassed in the first phase, not removed from the attacking structure altogether.

The success of this approach depends on the positioning around the intended receiver. We need nearby options, players ready to support the next action and enough structure to turn the initial distribution into controlled possession. If those connections aren’t there, we’re simply giving the ball away. The objective is to progress beyond the press, rather than through it.

3. Go Narrower

When: Against opponents who defend with a compact block, protect the central areas and make it difficult for us to play through the middle.

Why: Our wing-backs already provide natural width, while the attacking midfielders occupy the spaces between the opposition’s defensive and midfield lines. Asking the team to play narrower should bring our central relationships closer together, creating shorter passing distances and more opportunities for combinations.

The intention isn’t to cram more players into the middle for the sake of it. It is to improve the connections between the players already occupying those spaces, making it easier to combine, draw defenders out of position and create openings. We should still use the width provided by our wing-backs; the adjustment is about where the supporting players position themselves.

Tier Two: Game-state adjustments

These are different. They are not simply alternative ways of progressing the ball, but responses to the circumstances of a match. They may require us to compromise some of our usual principles in pursuit of a particular result.

1. Disrupt

When: When the match is becoming increasingly stretched, the opposition is building momentum, or we need to interrupt the rhythm of a game that is moving away from us.

Why: Sometimes the most useful intervention is to slow things down. Managing the tempo, taking more care over restarts and reducing the opportunities for the opposition to build momentum can help us regain control. This isn’t about becoming negative for the sake of it; it is about recognising that controlling a match also means controlling its rhythm.

2. Throw the Kitchen Sink

When: When we are behind late in a match and need to find a goal, with little value in preserving our usual balance.

Why: There comes a point when the risk of conceding another goal becomes less important than the need to score one. We can commit more players forward, increase the tempo, take greater risks in possession and put the opposition under sustained pressure. It is deliberately uncomfortable for our normal structure, but that is the point: the game state demands a different calculation.

3. Shut Up Shop

When: When we are protecting a narrow lead in the closing stages and the priority is to see the result out.

Why: This is about reducing unnecessary risk. We can lower the tempo, become more conservative in possession, reduce the space available to the opposition and prioritise defensive organisation over attacking ambition. It isn’t necessarily how we want to play for 90 minutes, but there is no virtue in pursuing our usual attacking principles when the match requires us to protect what we have.

The distinction between the two tiers is important. In the first, we are changing how we access the game; in the second, we are responding to what the game requires of us. The identity should remain constant, but the route towards achieving our objectives does not have to.